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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No. 880346-CA

v.
Priority No. 2

DANNY L. PIERCE,
Defendant-Appellant.

RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR REHEARING
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Danny L. Pierce, was charged with presenting a
false or fraudulent insurance claim, a second degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. Section 76-6-521 (1978).
Defendant entered a plea of not guilty to the charge and was
found guilty by a jury on February 22, 1988. Defendant filed an
appeal raising four issues to the Utah Court of Appeals. Upon
review, the Court found defendant's appeal meritorious reversing
the trial court's decision. The case was remanded for a new trial
with instructions to the trial court as to how to approach the
statute of limitations issue. The State now seeks clarification
of the instructions set forth in the appellate opinion.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts are fully set forth in appellant's brief and are
restated in the Court's opinion.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
There

is

some

question

as

to

what

the

trial

court's

responsibility is when the case is heard on remand. The issue
which should be addressed

and clarified is the manner in

which

the trial court should approach the statute of limitation issue.
This Court should clarify the approach because the method of the
California courts, the authorities relied upon in the Court's
opinion.

The California courts treat legal issues

such as

defective informations as matters of law for the trial court to
rule

upon

and

factual

issues

determine.

The

defective

as

matters

information

or

for

the

pleading

jury

to

statute

of

limitation issue is treated differently in California than in
Utah and the cases cited by this Court tend to involve the
defective pleading problem and could be confusing to the trial
court and attorneys involved.
INTRODUCTION
A classic pleading problem is raised in In re Demillo, 14
Cal 3d 598, 535 P. 2d 1181, 121 Cal. Rptr. 727 (1975). In that
case

the

defendant

plead

guilty

to

an

information.

The

information was silent as to when the offense was committed. It
was also silent as to the fact that the defendant had been
outside the state for the critical statute of limitations period.
The

defendant

filed

a

writ

of

habeas

corpus

attacking

the

jurisdiction of the trial court. The California appellate court
held that the accusatory pleading must allege facts showing that
the prosecution is not barred by the statute of limitations. In
the absence of such an allegation in the information, the court

lacked

jurisdiction

to

hear

the

matter

and

defendant

was

discharged. The case, People v. Padfield, 136 Cal. App. 3d 218,
185 Cal. Rptr. 903 (1982) is

similar. In Padfield the defendant

entered a no contest plea after initially resisting the charge by
proceeding

to

trial.

During

trial

the

defendant's

counsel

belatedly discovered that the defendant's out of state absence
tolled the statute of limitations. The defendant then hastily
changed his plea pursuant to a plea bargain.

The trial court

addressed the statute of limitations issue with the defendant at
the time of his plea.

The defendant persisted in his plea and

later attempted to raise the statute of limitation issue on
appeal.

The

appellate

court

rejected

the

defendant's

attack

noting that the defendant's plea acknowledged each and every
element of the offense.

Notwithstanding the defendant's attempt

to make his case similar to Demillo, the appellate court was not
persuaded. The case did not present the same issues, but did give
the

court

an

opportunity

to

discourse

on

the

approach

the

California courts take with respect to the statute of limitations
issue. This Court has taken a different approach to the defective
information problem as evidenced by the first portion of its
opinion in this matter.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATION REQUIREMENT IS
A JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENT.
Statutes of limitation are legislative creations which limit
the power of the State to initiate prosecutions. The statute of

limitation is not an element of the offense. State v. Tibor, 373
N.W.2d 877 (N.D. 1985). Utah's statute of limitation on criminal
offenses is no exception. It is a legislative proscription on the
right to prosecute. It serves the purpose of encouraging the
State to bring charges

in a timely manner and protects the

individual from stale prosecutions.

As this court has ruled, the

State bears the burden of proving the facts to support its claim
that the statute of limitation has been complied with in any
given case.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD REVIEW DEFENDANT'S REQUEST
TO DETERMINE IF IT PRESENTS A QUESTION OF FACT.
A statute of limitations issue may present an issue of law
or may

present

presented,

a

a

trial

factual

issue. Where

court may

rule

an

issue

upon the

of

law is

issue. Where a

question of fact is presented, then the prevailing rule suggests
that a jury must rule as to whether the prosecution was initiated
during the appropriate period. State v. Wyman, 198 Kan. 666, 426
p. 2d 26

(Kan. 1967); Criminal Law, Section

1132, 23A C.J.S.

(1968).

A typical legal issue is the defective pleading issue

raised in Demillo.
When a defendant raises a statute of limitation question,
the trial court should first determine if the question raised by
the accused presents a question of law or a question of fact. If
the matter is one of law,
issue.

However,

if

the trial court may rule upon the

the defendant

has raised

an

issue which

involves a factual dispute, such as the one presented in this

case, then the trial court should submit the matter to the jury
for its determination. The previous approach taken by the trial
court in this case should be avoided.
take

evidence

to

The trial court should not

attempt to resolve factual

disputes

as to

whether the a particular crime was discovered when the trier of
fact

i.e.

evidence.

the

jury

may

reach

different

conclusions

on

the

Typical of questions that ought to be submitted to a

jury are issues involving discovery of the offense and tolling of
statute of limitation.
The State argues that a "standard" needs to be adopted for
determining when a question of needs be submitted to a jury. No
standard need be adopted. The State's example is an attempt to
allow the trial court to adjudicate facts which it should submit
to a jury by placing a conclusionary labeling test on the facts.
(See addendum note.) If any test should be applied, it should be
a test similar to that of summary judgment. If there is genuine
issue with respect to a factual question, then the matter ought
to be submitted to the jury.
The trial court should apply a preponderance of evidence
standard upon those issues requiring its decision.

The jury

should apply its traditional standard of beyond a reasonable
doubt on matters that are submitted to it for findings.
in

the

respondent's

brief,

the

"some

As noted

evidence" standard

is

inappropriate.
CONCLUSION
The trial court should first determine whether an issue of
law or fact is presented when the defendant raises a statute of

limitations issue. If the issue is one of law, then the trial
court

should

proceed

to

deal with

the

issue

and

apply

the

preponderance of the evidence standard. If the issue involves
facts, such as the discovery question in this case, then the
trial court should require the matter to be presented to the
jury. The jury would apply its traditional standard with respect
to the evidence•
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ^l
r^

J

day of August, 1989.
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ADDENDUM
Without a presentation of the underlying facts,

one cannot

arrive at the conclusion that "discovery" is equal to "mere
suspicion."
1939).

See Turner v. Liner, 87 P. 2d 740, 742 (Cal. App.

This case clearly indicates the need for a court to hear

the underlying facts as evidence^ by this quotation:
"Discovery" and "knowledge" are not convertible terms,
and whether there has been a "discovery" of the facts
"constituting the fraud" within the statute of
limitations, is a question of law to be determined by
the court from the facts pleaded. As in the case of
any other legal conclusion, it is not sufficient to
make averment thereof, but the facts from which the
conclusion follows must themselves be pleaded. It is
not enough that plaintiff merely avers that he was
ignorant of the facts at the time of the occurrence,
has not been informed of them until within the three
years.
He must show that the acts of fraud were
committed under such circumstances that he would not be
presumed to have any knowledge of them—as that they
were done in secret or were kept concealed; and he must
show that the times and circumstances under which the
facts constituting the fraud were brought to his
knowledge, so that the court may determine whether
discovery of these facts was within the time alleged,
and the means of knowledge are equivalent to knowledge,
if it appears that the plaintiff had notice or
information of the circumstances which would put him on
an inquiry which if followed, would lead to knowledge,
or that the facts were presumptively within the
knowledge he will be deemed to have had actual
knowledge of these facts.
These principles are so
fully recognized that mere reference to some of the
cases in which they have been reinforced will be
sufficient. (Citations omitted). Turner v. Liner. 87
P.2d at 742.
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